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Abstract: This paper investigates lexical evidentials in an English corpus of opinion articles  about oil drilling issues 
in USA. It will be shown through multilevel annotation that evidentials, depending on their lexical semantics, indicate 
specific types of standpoints and premises as far as (inter)subjectivity and objectivity are concerned.  
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1. Introduction  
 
This paper addresses the management of subjectivity and objectivity through a semantic-
argumentative analysis of lexical evidentials in a corpus of opinion articles centerd on oil drilling 
issues. The aims of the study are twofold: the first one is to propose systematic criteria to identify 
strategies of objectification combining the folk notion of objectivity with the linguistic notion of 
(inter)subjectivity. The second is to provide an example of the argumentative role played by the 
evidentials in presenting subjective/objective premises-conclusion relations in social debates 
involving different stakeholders.  
 Lexical evidentials (see for example Bybee 1985, Anderson 1986, Cornillie 2009) are 
constructions that can be used to signal the presence and the type of source of information 
supporting a statement both in English and in Italian (e.g. “[Mark’s car is not in the parking lot 
anymore]source of info. “He must have left/evidently he has left”). They can be direct, when 
relying on data attested through perception (e.g. see), or indirect, when implying inferences (e.g. 
must, seem) or hearsay/report (e.g. apparently) as an information source (Willett 1988, p. 57). 
 The affinity between the linguistic category of evidentiality and argumentation, a mode of 
communication in which “arguments succeed when the persons to whom they are addressed accept 
their conclusions on the basis of their premises” (Pinto 2001, p. 37), has recently brought scholars 
to focus on the role of evidentials in argumentative contexts. Taking a context dependent semantic 
approach, recent qualitative studies have investigated predictions in a corpus of Italian economic-
financial news. These studies have shown that evidentials indicate and constrain argumentative 
discourse relations, working as argumentative indicators (van Eemeren et al. 2007) useful for the 
analyst at different levels. In particular, drawing from the framework of Relative Modality (Kratzer 
1981) Rocci (2009, 2012, 2013) claims that the modal verb dovere (‘must’) works as a relational 
operator. It links the propositions in its scope to a set of anaphorically contextual and co-textual 
propositions functioning as a conversational background. Likewise, Miecznikoswki’s (2011) study 
of the conditional form potrebbe (‘could’) highlights the relevance of construction types in 
                                                        
1  This study has been conducted thanks to the support of the Swiss National Foundation early post doc 
project “From semantics to argumentation mining in context: the role of evidential strategies as indicators 
of argumentative discourse relations” 
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constraining the possible set of conversational backgrounds for interpreting sentences. In other 
words, both verbs, in specific syntactic constructions, behave as inferential evidentials signaling 
the presence of a premises-standpoint relation. The same applies for appearance verbs (e.g. seem, 
appear) which have also turned out to impose constrains at the level of argument schemes (Musi 
2014, Miecznikowski and Musi 2015, Musi 2015). 
 The verbs must, can and other linguistic items (cf. section 3) assume, both in English and 
Italian, an evidential function only in m-performative constructions, “which express the speaker’s 
current attitude towards the state of affairs [...]” (Nuyts 2001, p. 40). A necessary condition for 
linguistic constructions to express evidentiality is, therefore, that of expressing subjectivity, 
defined as “the capacity of the speaker to posit himself as ‘subject’” (Benveniste 1958, p. 224).  
However, beside prompting the recovery of premises and indicating the speakers’ 
commitment towards standpoints, evidentials match with specific polyphonic patterns: they are 
not primarily used to assess the speaker’s knowledge but have an interpersonal function operating 
“rhetorically to influence beliefs, attitudes, expectations and modes of interrelating” (White 2003, 
p. 259). In particular, when the sources of information are textually expressed or verbalized, 
evidentials realize the argumentative act of effecting “an inference in the person to whom it is 
addressed” (Pinto 1996, p. 168). They instruct the interlocutor on how to the recover the speaker’s 
premises in order to consciously reach agreement or diasgreement. In doing so, evidentials provide 
information on how the relationship between the speaker and the advanced epistemic judgment is 
presented and, therefore, perceived by the interlocutor on a scale having at its extremes subjectivity 
and objectivity.  
 As clarified in section 2., an epistemic statement can be both subjective or objective 
depending on the nature of the premises it is drawn from. In this regard, direct evidentials like 
perception verbs are good candidates to encode objective premises since they presuppose the 
presence of potentially measureble events of a sensorial nature. Other evidential strategies, 
characterized by more vague lexical semantic features (see section 3) are compatible with a wide 
range of premises which can be can be difficult to position on the subjectivity/objectivity axis. 
They call for a more fine-grained notion such as that of (inter)subjectivity. Although evidentials 
scales and degrees of certainty are for sure connected (see Pietrandrea 2005), lexical evidentials 
expressing a high modal force do not necessarily presuppose objective premises. They simply 
signal a high degree of commitment on the speaker’s part.  
 The above-mentioned semantic and pragmatic features make evidentials a privileged 
viewpoint for the analysis of premises-conclusion relations in terms of the subjectivity-objectivity 
distinction: i) they introduce the presence of a statement to which the speaker is committed as an 
aware subject ii) they constrain the type of state of affairs functioning as premises iii) they provide 
hints on how the speaker wants to present his statement to the interlocutor.  
 The study will be structured as follows: in section 2. some preliminary theoretical issues 
will be discussed, with particular reference to the linguistic notion of (inter)subjectivity and its 
relevance for the analysis of subjective vs. objective arguments. In section 3. the collected data 
and the set of selected evidential strategies will be presented. In section 4. the layers considered in 
the performed annotation will be justified and described. Section 5. will be devoted to the 
presentation of the annotation results.  
 
2.  Theoretical issues: from subjectivity/objectivity to (inter)subjectivity  
 
As sketched out in the introduction, evidentials are core strategies for the mise en discours of the 
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pragmatic category of subjectivity. The scholarly debate in the linguistic literature on the 
dimension of subjectivity, as pointed out by a recent special issue of English Text Constructions 
(2012), has given rise to various non overlapping definitions of the category pointing to semantic 
as well as pragmatic or cognitive features. In this section, I will tackle only those definitions that 
are relevant for the study of evidentials and their discursive functions.  
 Lyons (1977, pp. 797-798) makes reference to the dichotomy subjectivity/objectivity 
primarily to ditinguish between two types of epistemic modalities: according to the scholar 
subjective epistemic modality indicates the speaker’s conjecture regarding the truth of the 
proposition in the modal’s scope, while objective epistemic modality expresses the objectively 
measurable possibility that it is true. Lyons himself recognizes that there are no systematic criteria 
for deciding out of context if the epistemic modality expressed by a construction is subjective or 
objective. The following same sentence could be, for example, interpreted both as subjective or 
objective:  
 
1) “Alfred may be unmarried” (Lyons 1977: 797) 
 
 In a first interpretation, the sentence in 1) indicates that the speaker is uncertain about 
Alfred being a bachelor. In this case, the sentence can be paraphrased as “Perhaps Alfred is 
unmarried,” constituting an example of subjective modality. In a second interpretation, the modal 
may expresses a mathematically computable probability (objective epistemic modality) that Alfred 
is unmarried, given that the speaker knows that Alfred is part of a community of 90 people, 30 of 
which are married.  
Despite efforts in the literature to associate the traits of subjectivity and objectivity to 
specific modal types (Palmer 1979, Coates 1983, Kiefer 1984), the lack of systematic criteria to 
define the objectivity of a statement has not allowed scholars to operationalize these concepts for 
the analysis of sentences in oral communication or corpora. 
 A possible solution to this impasse has been proposed by Nuyts (2001). He has anchored 
the dimension of subjectivity to the reliability of evidential sources of information available to the 
speaker when making an epistemic judgement. In particular, Nuyts (2001) considers most reliable 
those sources of information accessible not only to the speaker, but to the entire speech community. 
More specifically, the two 'poles' of the dimension of subjectivity have been defined as follows: 
 
[…] does the speaker suggest that she alone knows the evidence and draws a 
conclusion from it; or does (s)he indicates that the evidence is known to (or 
accessible by) a larger group of people who share the conclusion based on it. In the 
former case the speaker assumes strictly the responsibility for the epistemic 
qualification, in the latter case (s)he assumes a shared responsibility for it (although 
(s)he remains corresponsible too, of course) (Nuyts 2001, p. 393). 
 
 Since this definition focuses on the interacting participants in the communicative situation, 
Nuyts (2001) has replaced the vague notion of objectivity with that of intersubjectivity. The basic 
assumption underlying (inter)subjectivity is an intuitive one: shared access to sources of 
information is likely to ensure a greater reliability of the statements they justifiy.   
 However, it is often a hard task to identify the set of sources of information available to the 
speaker, and to interpret them as more or less accessible to the other participants (see e.g 1). In 
light of this, more recently Nuyts (2012) has situated subjectivity and intersubjectivity at the level 
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of the modal evaluation: 
 
-A modal evaluation is ‘subjective’ if it is presented as being strictly the 
assessor’s sole responsibility 
-A modal evaluation is ‘intersubjective’ if it is presented as being shared between 
the assessor and a wider group of people, possibly (but not necessarily) including 
the speaker. (Nuyts 2012, p. 58)  
 
In the present study both notions of (inter)subjectivity are taken into account. Corpus analysis has 
revealed that for the majority of evidential strategies the precise level at which subjectivity and 
intersubjectivity are encoded cannot be determined in a general manner, but has to be decided in 
context. Therefore, at a first level of analysis, personal responsibility of the assessor or, at the 
contrary, wider sharedness is taken into consideration. At a second level, premises, where textually 
expressed, are analysed in terms of sharedness. In this way, it is possible to keep track of 
correlations between the quality of evidence and the modal evaluation expressed by evidentials.  
 
3. Data  
 
Lexical evidentials as strategies of subjectification and objectification have been investigated in 
an English corpus of opinion articles (30 texts) regarding oil drilling in the USA. Opinion articles 
are a prototypical argumentative text genre since they express the journalist’s argued prise de 
position about a specific issue of public interest (Gauthier 2007, p. 322). More specifically, they 
presuppose a particular rhetorical situation in which the writer takes up the double task of giving 
structure to a debate in the public sphere and of taking part in this debate by defending a standpoint. 
In articles about oil drilling issues the first task is a hard one due to the presence of numerous 
stakeholders involved (e.g. local communities, oil companies, environmentalists, federal 
regulators). For this reason, in some of the collected articles the journalist’s opinion is left implicit, 
though inferable from the newspaper’s orientation. The majority of space is devoted to evoke and 
update a common ground (Clark 1996) shareable by the newspaper’s audience and in which the 
necessarily compressed argumentative development of the opinion piece can be rooted.  
 The articles have been selected looking at the urls of a large set of tweets, automatically 
collected with the help of the Osservatorio di Pavia. The tweets have been retrieved searching a 
set of keywords, chosen as to include the widest range of possible sentiments towards oil drilling: 
e.g. 'notriv', 'no AND drilling', 'oil AND USA’. This method has been chosen since it has two 
advantages: it allows i) to recover a varied set of opinion articles both from national, local or 
thematic newspapers ii) to select the most visible opinion articles in the public sphere which 
correspond to the most tweeted ones. 
Lexical evidentials in English are evidential strategies (Aikhenvald 2004) – differently 
from grammatical evidentials, they are not specialised in the expression of sources of information, 
but convey a range of functions depending on syntactic and pragmatic features. Modal items as 
well as items expressing perception function cross-linguistically as evidential strategies in those 
constructions in which they have scope over propositions and events. The overlap between the 
categories of modality, perception and evidentiality has been investigated throughout (see 
Pietrandrea 2005, Musi 2015 for a summary), even though their closeness is intuitive: the 
conceptual activity of thinking that things might be otherwise (modality) implies having some 
reasons to believe so (evidentiality), while perception is our first means of knowledge.   
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 The lexical semantics of different linguistic items constrains their evidential function: 
modals can work as inferential evidentials (Rocci 2012) or express, especially when at the 
conditional mode, hearsay and report (cf. Miecznikowski 2011). Perception-related items cover 
the whole range of evidential types: items lexically specific as to the sense modality (e.g. see, hear, 
taste) tend to express direct evidentiality, while those items in which the modality of perception is 
more vague (e.g. seem, apparently) generally express indirect evidence of the inferential or 
reportative type (Mieczikowski and Musi 2015).  
 The class of evidentials considered in this study has been formed collecting those modals 
and perception-related items so far investigated in the linguistic literature as evidential strategies 
(e.g. see Usoniene 1999, Simon-Vanderbergen and Aijmer 2007). However, due to the lack of a 
complete lexicon of evidentials, the initial set has been increased during corpus analysis; the 
linguistic constructions which recurrently have the function of pointing to the presence and/or the 
type of sources of information have been added to the list. The considered set of lexical evidentials, 
divided according to the part of speech evidentials belong to, is the following: 
 
Verbs: can (could), must (should), may (might) would, see, sound, appear, evidence, seem, 
result, find, reveal, prove 
Noun: evidence  
Predicative constructions: (to be) possible/impossible/likely/unlikely/clear/evident/obvious 
Adverbs: obviously, clearly, plainly, evidently, manifestly, patently, apparently, surely. 
 
4. Annotation  
 
The occurrences of lexical evidentials have been annotated through the web based annotation tool 
Brat (http://brat.nlplab.org) which enables entirely user-based annotation schemes. The proposed 
annotation scheme encompasses four main layers which are described here in detail.  
 1) The first layer concerns the identification of lexical evidentials with specification of their 
part of speech (verbs, nouns, adverbs, predicative constructions) and the type of evidence they 
express. As clarified in section 2., it is not sufficient to retrieve modal or perceptual lexemes to 
identify evidential strategies, but it is necessary to recognize their m-performative constructions. 
In this regard, a necessary condition is the presence of a proposition, namely an entity that can be 
judged as true or false (Lyons 1977, pp. 438-442), on which the evidential has scope. In a sentence 
like “I see they are drilling offshore”, the speaker communicates that he knows, thanks to his sense 
of sight, that the proposition “they are drilling offshore” is true, while a sentence like “I see the 
pipeline” simply encodes a perceptual event.   
 In operational terms, other criteria to identify m-performative constructions may vary 
depending on the lexemes under investigation. Morpho-syntactic past tense reveal, for example, 
can have m-performative evidential readings, while past tense seem is semantically past and non 
m-performative: given a sentence like “it seemed that drilling was not regulated” it is plausible 
that the speaker does not still believe at the moment of utterance that drilling was not regulated, 
while through a sentence like “inspections revealed that drilling was not regulated” the speaker’s 
commitment towards p is still valid. Generally speaking, constructions are considered m-
performative when expressing an assessor’s attitude towards a proposition which is still valid at 
the article’s moment of discourse. The assessor does not have to coincide with the journalist: in 
the collected opinion articles various voices are put ‘on stage’ in a fictive dialogical situation where 
a network of speakers are involved.  
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 To annotate the types of evidence the traditional taxonomy proposed by Willett 1988 (see 
introduction) has been followed. Due to the presence of multiple voices, particular attention has 
been devoted to the distinction between inference and report in occurrences of indirect reported 
discourse. In these cases, the presence of a modal verb at the conditional mode does not always 
indicate report, but frequently signals the presence of an inference: in the sentence “Knudsen thinks 
those spills could be reduced by frequent monitoring” (opinion article, Climate Press), the verb 
could indicates an inference drawn by Knudsen starting from a set of contextual information 
sources; the conditional mode signals posteriority of the event “to reduce spills through frequent 
monitoring” with respect to the moment of utterance as well the presence of a conditional restrictor, 
namely the will of oil companies to finance monitorings. To distinguish cases of this kind from 
cases in which the conditional mode has a reportative value, a possible test is that of transforming 
the sentence into direct reported discourse and observe if the conditional mode would be 
maintained (inferential value) or not (reportative value).  
 2) The second layer corresponds to the semantic type of propositions evidentials have scope 
on. The adopted typology stems from that proposed by Freeman (2000) based on the dichotomy 
between broadly logically determinate statements, which are necessary true or false (e.g. “either it 
is raining or it is not”), and broadly logically contingent statements. Among contingent statements 
evaluations are distinguished from natural non evaluative statements. Evaluations are those 
propositions which contain an axiological predicate, e.g. “Bringing fracking to the Everglades 
would be highly irresponsible” (opinion article, The Guardian), or implicitly express it, e.g. 
“These areas are special to us and should never have been put on the table in the first place” 
(opinion article, Bloomberg Business Innovator). Natural non evaluative statements are in turn 
divided into descriptions and interpretations. Descriptions are extensional statements since 
specifying the conditions under which they are true we do not make any reference to other possible 
worlds: in a sentence like “An investigation by the Associated Press revealed that were more than 
200 instances of fracking operations in state and federal waters off California which were all 
unknown to the state agency […]” (opinion article, Climate Press) the embedded proposition 
constitutes an unassailable fact. Intensional statements are included under the label 
‘interpretations’. This latter label has been enriched with two other more subtle distinctions which 
have been turned out to be highly relevant during the annotation, namely interpretations which are 
at the same time predictions (e.g. “But one company is putting technology to use that it says could 
end up making the process a lot safer,” opinion article, ClimatePress) and interpretations which 
encode a directive speech act (e.g. “we should moving forwards with a policy that ensures we have 
reliable supplies of oil and gas for decades to come,” opinion article, Bloomgerg Business 
Innovators).  
 3) The third layer makes reference to the type of modal evaluation. The major distinction 
is that between subjective vs. intersubjective statements. As explained by Nuyts (2012, see section 
2.), (inter)subjectivity is a matter of how statements are presented in terms of shared or personal 
commitment to their truth. In some occurrences in which the identity of the assessors is explicit, 
the annotation task is straightforward (e.g. “Experts […] suggest the critical habitat designation is 
more likely to affect development of offshore wind than oil and gas”, opinion article, The State). 
In the other occurrences, morpho-syntactic clues can be exploited in the annotation process. In 
particular, with m-performative uses of perception verbs (e.g. see, hear, seem, look like) and verbs 
of thinking (e.g. find), assessors feature as one of the obligatory participants in the verbs’ argument 
structure. However, there is variation at the syntactic level as to the manner assessors are encoded: 
some perception verbs (e.g. seem, sound, look like) attribute a grammatical subject role to a 
ELENA MUSI 
7 
perceived/conceived object, while assessors can either be left implicit or be overtly expressed in 
the syntactic function of an indirect object, allowing to trace (inter)subjectivity. Other agent-
oriented perception verbs (e.g. see, hear) and cognitive verbs are even more informative since they 
locate assessors in subject position, making it easy for the annotator to label the evidential 
construction as subjective or (inter)subjective. The same applies for those occurrences in which 
modal verbs/adverbs appear in a proposition subordinate to cognitive predicate, as in “we believe 
that […] many yield mandated investors who hold PGF may be force to liquidate” (opinion article, 
CalgaryHerald).  
 However, the situation is more blurred when modal verbs appear in the main statement, 
since the entity in subject position does not provide any information about the assessor, but works 
as a participant (agent or patient) of the event expressed by the embedded proposition: the sentence 
“We need a clear commitment from the federal government on revenue sharing” (opinion article, 
Center for American Progress) would, for example, be roughly equivalent to the sentence “it is 
necessary that [we]agent obtain a clear commitment from the federal government on revenue 
sharing,” compatible both with subjective or (inter)subjective responsibility. These kinds of 
contexts, in absence of further clues, have been annotated as subjective, unless contextual 
information clarifies that the assessor works as spokesman for a community.  
 Statements annotated as ‘subjective’ are further divided into those in which the assessor 
coincides with the journalist and those in which a third party is the origin and the responsible of a 
given discourse: “While it is possible [that the offshore industry will reach this same ultimate drop 
in rigs]singular-journalist, Deloitte believes [it is unlikely]singular-third party” (opinion article, Offshore).  
Similarly, among (inter)subjective statements a distinction is made depending on the 
epistemic position of the journalist which can or cannot be one of the assessors. 
 4) The fourth layer addresses sources of information which function, in an argumentative 
perspective, as premises, and their accessability. Sources of information have been annotated as 
‘singular’ when available to the assessor only. A typical example is when premises make reference 
to the assessor’s feelings or memories, per definition not accessible to anybody else. However, 
such a situation is not congruent with the text genre of opinion articles. In the present study, 
premises have been annotated as ‘singular’ when left textually implicit. As it will be explained in 
the next section, implicitness happens to correlate with peculiar rhetorical situations. When 
textually expressed, premises have been annotated either as ‘shared’ or ‘shareable’. The first label 
refers to those cases in which premises are known by a group of people, such as a local community, 
or constitute facts which could be verified by people other than the assessor. The second label 
refers to those cases in which premises are predictions or interpretations with which a larger 
audience could agree o disagree.  
 
5. Annotation results  
 
The first level of annotation has revealed that evidential strategies are relevant clues for the study 
of (inter)subjectivity since they occur in any of the considered texts. Their distribution according 






    
POS  Direct  Inference  Report  Hearsay TOT  
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Verbs  12 70 8 0 90 
Predicative 
constructions 
1 12 0 0 13 
Adverbs  0 6 0 0 6 
Nouns  1 0 0 0 1 
TOT  14 88 8 0 110 
 
Fig1. Distribution of lexical evidentials in the corpus 
 
 As shown in Fig. 1. the majority of evidential strategies encode inference as an information 
source, while hearsay is not expressed by any of them. Inferential evidentials are both modals and 
perception/cognition related items belonging to different parts of speech. Reportative and direct 
evidentials are more restricted. The only strategy signalling that the proposition it has scope on 
originates in a discourse different from the journalist’s is the conditional form would, e.g. “The 
bill’s sponsor, Republican state senator Garrett Richter, argues that his proposal would actually 
protect Florida’s residents by introducing safeguards not yet in existence” (opinion article, The 
Guardian).  
 Direct evidentials encompass the perception verbs see, reveal (in the past tense), the noun 
evidence and the cognition verb prove: 
 
2) “BP's 2010 Deepwater Horizon spill in the Gulf of Mexico proved that an entire 
coastline could be affected by a massive oil spill” Pallone said. “We know what 
happens, we saw what happened with BP,” he said. “The spill was off of Louisiana, 
but it went all the way around the east coast of Florida. So if someone says to me, 
'Oh, we're going to do it in Virginia, that doesn't impact New Jersey,' that is totally 
false: It will impact the entire East Coast.” (opinion article, NJ.com)  
 
In example 2) the journalist quotesUS Representative Frank Pallone’s arguments against off-shore 
drilling in the Atlantic. Pallone argues through a reasoning from analogy that drilling off Virginia 
could have an impact on New Jersey, as drilling off Louisiana had an impact on the Florida coast. 
Using the evidential verb prove he explicitly states that what happened in concomitance with the 
Deepwater Horizon spill in the Gulf of Mexico, here playing the role of grammatical subject, 
shows the truth of the statement “an entire coastline could be affected by a massive oil spill.” The 
reasoning leading to the truth of the proposition is a rhetorical induction (generalization starting 
from a single case) presented, through the use of the verb prove. This verb semantically entails the 
truth of the proposition it has scope on, as non defeasible and objectively true. The spill in the gulf 
of Mexico is, in fact, not a random case, but constitutes what Aristotle would have called a 
paradeigma (Rhet. I.2, 1357b25ff), namely an exemplar case. The validity of this process of 
generalization is reaffirmed by Pallone though the juxtaposition of the two sentences “[we know 
what happens]generalization  (since) [we saw what happened with BP]exemplar case”, which could be 
linked by a causal explicit connective. The verb know is a factive verb (Beaver and Geurts 2011) 
that presupposes the truth of the embedded proposition. The premise supporting it is, in fact, 
presented as a non assailable basic premise (Freeman 2005): the verb see in the past tense specifies 
that the consequences of that spill were attestable through sight, the most reliable among our 
senses, and could have been objectively measured, by anyone, as expressed by the first person 
pronoun we.   
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 Similarly to the verb prove, the verb reveal semantically entails that the proposition it has 
scope on is a basic premise. The verb reveal, at the past tense, is a dynamic perception verb which 
encodes a shift form subjectivity to (inter)subjectivity since it signals that  the entity in subject 
position makes known to other people (lit. ‘remove the veil’) a real state of affairs that was 
previously unknown: 
 
3) “In 2013, an investigation by the Associated Press revealed that there were more 
than 200 instances of fracking operations in state and federal waters off California 
which were all unknown to the state agency that oversees offshore oil and gas” 
(opinion article, ClimateProgress).  
 
 To summarize, direct evidentials work in opinion articles as strategies of objectification 
since they implicitly frame the embedded propositions as true. As to the semantic type of 
proposition is concerned, they introduce descriptions. At the level of argumentation structure, 
descriptions are good candidates to work as premises but they do not meet the key felicity condition 
of assertives functioning as standpoints, namely that “the speaker supposes that the assertive is not 
immediately acceptable to the listener” (Van Eemeren et al. 2007, p. 29).  
 On the other hand, inferential evidentials are not compatible with extensional statements 
since they express a modal evaluation, while they can introduce both interpretations and 
evaluations. The presence of an evidential of the inferential type presupposes the existence of a set 
of premises in support of the truth of the embedded proposition. In other words, inferential 
evidentials are indicators at a micro-argumentative level since they mark the presence of premise-
conclusion relations. The proposition they introduce can be both the main standpoint or a local 
standpoint playing the role of a non-basic assailable premise in the whole argumentative structure.  
The distribution of the semantic types of proposition introduced by evidentials in the 
considered corpus is represented in the following table: 
 
 
Fig. 2. Distribution of types of semantic propositions in the evidentials’ scope 
 
 As shown in Fig. 2 interpretations of the prediction type are the most frequent ones. This 
is consistent with the argumentative context the collected articles are framed in: arguments pros 
and cons oil drilling, regardless the specific perspective (e.g. economy, sustainability), point to 
future consequences as reasons that should guide decision makers. Predictions co-occur in the 
corpus with textually expressed premises, a part from 5 cases in which the source is a ‘third party’ 
and the proposition in the evidential’s scope constitutes an argument from expert opinion (Walton 
and Reed 2003):  
 








4) “ ‘When we look at our demand for natural gas, we’re probably going to be 
another 5-10 bcf (billion cubic feet) per day of demand for the next 10 years’, 
Proctor said” (opinion article, The Tribune) 
 
 In example 4), as well as in the other cases, the assessor is an expert, namely a senior market 
analyst with Ponderosa Energy in Denver. Even if the premises supporting Proctor’s predictions 
would have been expressed, the audience would have not had the competences to judge their 
soundness. Therefore, shared access to sources of information and (inter)subjectivity is necessary 
blocked. That of giving voice to experts can be considered another strategy of objectification: 
experts are, according to our encyclopaedic knowledge, reliable and they strongly recall the frame 
of science which is associated to the realm of objectivity. 
 Turning to the third level of annotation, predictions and other kinds of interpretations have 
resulted to convey either a subjective or an (inter)subjective modal qualification (ca. 60%), while 
evaluations only subjective ones. Due to the restricted size of the corpus, it is not possible to draw 
any generalization concerning associations between semantic type of standpoints ad degrees of 
(inter)subjectivity.  
 A clearer pattern concerns, instead, premises’ accessability signalled by different evidential 
lexemes. From the analyzed data it appears that lexemes which express a strong stance are those 
more frequently associated with premises textually expressed and easily recoverable, as in the 
following example:   
 
5) “it is clearer than ever that oil and gas are the wrong energy sources to pursue 
along the Atlantic coast. [Not only does offshore hydrocarbon development 
jeopardize recreation, tourism, wildlife, and fisheries from the explosive 
underwater blasting of seismic surveying to the inevitable leaks and spills that 
accompany production]premise 1 but [independent analysis shows that drilling is far 
from the economic cure-all that Big Oil is advocates have made it out to be ] premise 
2. In a January 2015 report, Oceana compared a conservative estimate of 
developable Atlantic coast offshore wind resources with the oil industry is own 
estimates for economically recoverable oil and gas reserves in the same area and 
found that offshore wind would generate substantially more energy and 
employment over the same 20-year time horizon, without the risks to water quality 
and coastal communities” (opinion article, American Progress)  
  
The impersonal evidential predicative construction it is clearer than ever in 5) expresses a high 
degree of epistemic commitment on the part of the journalist: the adjective clear marks the truth 
proposition “oil and gas are the wrong energy sources to pursue along the Atlantic coast” as 
(inter)subjectively apparent and the superlative absolute form further increases the  modal force 
conveyed by the adjective’s lexical semantics. The premises supporting the statement appear 
immediately afterwards in adjacent position. Their function as coordinated arguments is signalled 
by the presence of the correlative conjunction not only….but also that, a part from clarifying the 
discourse relation between the two premises, establishes an ascendent climax in argumentative 
force since the second argument constitutes at the same time a refutation of the argument generally 
exploited by oil drilling supporters. Furthermore, as to accessability, both premises are shared: the 
drawbacks listed in premise 1 are called upon by entire local communities, while the responsible 
and the results of the “independent analysis” are explicitly stated in the following text.  
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 It has to be noticed that inferential lexical evidentials presuppose the presence of a set of 
premises a1-a2 but do not impose constrains, differently from lexical connectives (e.g. because), 
on the premises’ position which can, in fact, occur before or after the proposition on which the 
evidential has scope on and be frequently in a non adjacent position (see Musi 2015, pp. 338-343). 
The recurrent association between inferential evidentials expressing a high degree of epistemic 
commitment with premises textually adjacent and (inter)subjective is, thus, meaningful.  
 A possible explanation lies in the known correlation between the acceptability of premises 
and the acceptability of standpoints (Freeman 2005): when taking a decisive stand on issue 
journalists are more inclined to stress the presence of premises and to present them as highly 
acceptable. To this aim, they provide readers with premises that are i) easily recoverable ii) 
(inter)subjectively accessible and, hence, potentially acceptable. 
 Looking at the correlations between different levels of analysis, it has emerged that third 
parties’ statements tend to be backed up by textually expressed premises preferably when the 
journalist agrees with the reported evaluation/interpretation. This recurrent association has a 
rhetorical justification since it constitute a means for the journalist to implicitly undermines the 
reasonableness of their antagonists: when the premises supporting both the protagonist’s and the 
antagonist’s statements are expressed, readers can trace back the followed inferential paths and 
consciously reach agreement with one of the parties; when, instead, the premises supporting the 
antagonist’s standpoint are left unexpressed readers will plausibly align themselves to justified 
standpoint of the protagonist.  
 
6. Conclusion  
 
This study has focused on lexical evidentials as clues for the study of subjectivity and objectivity 
at a semantic-argumentative level. Lexical evidentials, working as argumentative indicators of 
premises-conclusion relations, allow to look at the correlations between the subjective-objective 
status of a statement in relation to that of its premises. The followed method of analysis has been 
corpus based. I started from theoretical considerations on the dimension of subjectivity and 
objectivity in a linguistic perspective and from previous studies about the discursive functions of 
evidentials. On these grounds, I have investigated how lexical evidentials pattern with the 
expression of subjectivity and objectivity in a corpus of opinion articles about oil drilling issues, 
through a multilevel syntactic, semantic and pragmatic annotation.  
 The obtained results provide insights both as to the methodology used to investigate 
subjectivity and objectivity and as to the role played by lexical evidentials as strategies of 
objectification in opinion articles.  
 With regard to methodology, as it has been already noticed in the linguistic literature, there 
are not systematic criteria available to the analyst to decide if a statement is objective. However, 
it is possible, thanks to the privileged viewpoint offered by evidentials, to investigate the degree 
of objectivity with which a statement is presented, integrating the notion of (inter)subjectivity.  
 Data analysis has shown that direct evidentials work as strategies of objectification since 
they frame the proposition they have scope on as factual. These propositions, according to 
Freeman’s typology (2000), are descriptions which play the argumentative role of basic 
unassailable premises. Assuming that the acceptability of standpoints depends on the acceptability 
of premises, the standpoints supported by premises that are marked by direct evidentials are 
presented as objective.  
 On the other hand, inferential and reportative evidentials introduce intensional statements, 
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namely evaluations and interpretations whose truth cannot be objectively measured. The envisaged 
solution is that of singling out the (inter)subjectivity of the modal qualification expressed by the 
evidential from the (inter)subjectivity of the propositions functioning as premises, when textually 
expressed. Applying this analytical method, it has emerged that evidentials which signal a high 
degree of commitment recurrently match with textually expressed adjacent premises of the 
(inter)subjective type which constitute an attempt of desubjectification on the part of the assessor. 
Even the lack of textually expressed premises has turned out to play a rhetorical function: in articles 
featuring multiple voices journalist are more inclined to report the premises of those participants 
to the discussion they agree with, presenting them as more reasonable.  
 The elaborated methodology will be applied in future work to annotate evidentials’ 
discursive functions in a quantitatively bigger corpus in order to verify the attested trends and 
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